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ABSTRACT 
Theories of collective behavior have proven inadequate for analyzing 
the many actions of workers because of the continuity of their 
association and organization. Working within the resource- management 
approach the research reported here uses national level time series 
from Great Britain and Sweden 1900-1950 to analyze the impact of 
governmental controls on strike activity and labor related street 
violence. Although there are clear effects of government controls 
on these forms of collective action, the data suggest developing 
the causal model in two directions. First, the mobilization patterns 
for the two countries suggest the presence of a legal-structural 
link. Second, the difference between the response of British strikes 
to controls in World Wars I and XI suggest that political success 
has a tendency to legitimize that behavior characteristic of a social 
movement at the time it acquires a regular position in the national 
structure of power. 
BACKGROUND 
The rumble of revolution was heard as industrial labor organized 
early in this century. Was it real or an illusion? The workers 
believed the slogans they shouted, but in retrospect we wonder whether 
the bourgeoisie should-have taken those unarmed demonstrators as 
seriously as they did. The skies are clear now. What are the right 
questions to ask if we want to study these issues? How should one study 
revolution? By selecting cases of revolution -- that is, by selecting 
successes and ignoring failures? Or, should we look on those times 
simply as offering curious examples,of crowd behavior, and pull out 
the tools of the sociologist appropriate for such a subject? 
When we look at the array of tools we have to draw upon there is a 
certain frustration and disappointment. The focus of equilibrium/ 
consensus theory on institutionalization, socialization and other 
pattern maintenance functions has tended to leave conflict as a residual 
category. This orientation can be traced to the origins of sociology 
in the last century when Comte, shaken by the trauma of the French 
revolution, sought to use positive science to build a theory of 
healthy society. 
Growing out of much the same nineteenth century orientation, we 
have a body of theory about collective behavior. Crowds and mobs 
appeared to break through randomly into the orderly world of ongoing, 
smoothly functioning institutions. Curiosity about this "aberrant" 
behavior, based on tacit assumptions regarding what reasonable, insti- 
tutionalized behavior should look like, led to contagion-of-mood 
theories -- social level causes and social level consequences 
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sandwiching what was essentially psychological analysis of the 
individuals involved in collective behavior. 
In the last decade or so dissatisfaction with old formulations 
has,resulted in a wide range of studies of collective violence -- 
studies of the causes of war, the relation between foreign and domestic 
conflict, revolution, episodes of collective.behavior,- and collective 
action associated with social movements.. Currie and Skolnik have, for 
example, called for a sharp break with old versions of collective 
behavior theory (1970). Weller and Quarantelli have questioned whether 
perhaps the crowd is not even the best prototype for collective 
.(I 
behavior (1973) . Recent studies of collective behavior in this country 
have suggested that "It is not the supposed anonymity of participants 
that is crucial to crowd formation, but the fact that crowds emerge 
from the nuclear cores provided by preexisting social relationships 
among members" (ibid., 681). In addition, extensive studies of collec- 
tive violence in France have addressed themselves to this issue 
(Merriman, forthcoming; Price 1972; Rude 1972). Analysis of arrest 
records shows that leadership came from members of rising or declining 
social groups, and that they had continuing contact and some level 
of organization prior to the incident. There is a historical gap 
between the sociology of organizations and the study of collective 
behavior which consistently handicaps theory and research in both 
areas (Oberschall 1973). 
Quite independently, the works of Tilly (1969, 1970a, 1970b), 
' \. 
Gamson (1968), Etzioni (1968) and Oberschall (1973) have used similar 
elements to elaborate a theory of social movements and collective 
action. They all assume interests, all focus on the movement. of scarce 
resources, all emphasize testable hypotheses, and all point to govern- 
ment as a salient actor. Tilly and Gamson independently developed the 
, notion of a "polity" (well-established social groups influential in 
relation to government) and of "challengers" (new groups mobilizing 
resources to make demands). 
Tilly moved toward his model out of extensive historical studies 
of collective violence in France. He began by hoping to specify the 
relationship between. urbanization and industrialization and only gradu- 
ally realized that he had encountered the most massive social phenomenon, 
yet one surprisingly invisible to sociologists -- the emergence and 
expansion of the modern state. His material showed "the intimate 
connection between the. routine operation of both local and national 
politics and the appearance of violent conflicts" (1970b). 
Gamson's point of departure was a critique of the American 
pluralists, who, in closing their minds to the possibility of collusion 
among polity members to exclude new-forming groups, have failed to 
consider techniques for exclusion. As a result the vocabulary of force, 
manipulation and deceptfon has been left to other disciplines. 
Etzioni came to his model with a normative goal -- that of 
describing a society which is cybernetic without paternalism or 
dictatorship - an "active society" in which social-movement type 
subgroups contribute to social policy. 
Oberschall's contribution is a review of the literature showing 
the weaknesses and gaps, showing the need for an interdisciplinary 
approach, and building a "resource management" theory. He argues that 
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the important theoretical gain derived from Olsen's Logic of Collective 
Action (1968) is that "a theory of mobilization of opposition and 
conflict groups, social and mass movements, of protest behavior and 
collective political action, is essentially the same as the theory of 
mobilization for economic interest groups, and that the simple assumption 
of rationality in economic theory is sufficient in this theoretical 
effort" (Oberschall 1973: 118). 
These have been valuable contributions to the field, emphasizing 
the use of interdisciplinary tools to develop a theoretical base for 
the broad study of collective action and social change. 
THEORY 
Because sociology is rich in theories of social change and poor in 
long-range historical studies testing hypotheses from these theories, I 
have chosen to make a comparative study of two social movements over a 
fifty-year period, 1900-1950. The labor movements of Great Britain and 
Sweden were chosen as examples of challenging groups within a nation- 
state social-political system. They are not "case studies" in the usual 
descriptive sense, but rather are used for testing hypotheses and for 
further developing the theory. The cases offer enough similarities to 
make specific elements of contrast interesting, Their mobilization 
patterns from the turn of the century to World War I were very similar; 
by World War I1 labor had moved into the polity in both countries. In 
contrast, we find that only Great Britain was a participant in the two 
World Wars, and only there was the labor movement threatened with anti- 
strike legislation. Sweden serves as a "control." 
The theory used is a resource-management theory in which we have 
three classes of actor: 
1. The government 
2. Members of the polity -- groups with routine access to and 
influence over the operations of government 
3.  Challengers -- groups which mobilize resources to make 
demands on other polity members and government 
Government is not only the most massive mobilizer and allocator 
of resources, but it also has the unique property of being the chief 
controller of coercive resources within a nation state. These forces 
-- army, police, sheriffs, constables -- tend to be called upon when 
interests of polity members are threatened by challengers. Polity 
members of course have resources themselves with which to exercise 
repression -- for example, the traditional normative and utilitarian 
resources of landlords vs. tenants or employers vs. laborers. 
Government repression is a special case, but one which is highly 
visible. 
The model used predicts level of conflict with two independent 
variables: mobilization and repression. Mobilization predicts 
positively to conflict and repression predicts negatively. I have 
tested hypotheses using "mobilization" in both senses in which the term 
has been used -- as a rate and as an absolute level, Repression, 
similarly, conceptualized in more than one way. Is its function linear 
or curvilinear?' For this investigation I have chosen to test a simple 
linear hypothesis: level of government repression has a negative, 
linear relation to level of conflict. Repression is defined here as 
any act of government which makes mobilization-more costly for the 
group under study, This avoids the circularity of a definition in terms 
I 1  of effect on conflict level, e,g., repression represses," 
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC CONFLICT 
This research was formulated as a theory-based alternative to 
recent a-theoretical studies seeking to determine whether there is a 
statistical, and thus perhaps causal, relationship between foreign and 
domestic conflict. Within the past decade or so a number of cross- 
national studies have been made using agnostic search methods like 
Z factor analysis, Very little has come of this research either sub- 
stantively or in terms of generating spin-off in the form of testable 
hypotheses and further research interest (Wilkenfeld 1973). 
Using this theory of collective action, the total level of 
"domestic conflict'' for any given nation state would be predicted by 
surveying all social subgroups and adding the positive weight for their 
mobilization to the negative weight for their repression. This research 
is intended to be an example of how such studies would be structured, 
rather than as a complete answer to the questions posed about so broad 
and diffuse a subject as the relationship between foreign and domestic 
con£ lict . 
INDICATORS (See Figures 1 and 2 at the end of paper,) 
The labor movement is one of the few social movements which 
collected good data on itself over a long time period, For both 
countries the indicators of mobilization w5thin unions which I have 
used a r e  s i z e  of membership and income, and r a t e  of increase  of member- 
ship  and income. Both of these  represent  t r a n s f e r s  of resources i n t o  
the  con t ro l  of t h e  group and both a r e  c r i t i c a l  f o r  pressing l a b o r ' s  
claims aga ins t  employer and government. S tudies  of France f ind  these  . 
ind ica to r s  p o s i t i v e l y  associa ted  with s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  (Shorter  and 
T i l l y  1973). 
Ind ica to r s  of l a b o r ' s  p o l i t i c a l  mobil izat ion i n  both coun t r i e s  is  
number of members of t h e  labor  par ty ,  percent  votes  t o  the  l abor  par ty ,  
and percent s e a t s  i n  t h e  parliament t o  t h e  labor  party.  Ind ica to r  f o r  
t h e  s t r eng th  of unions within the  labor  p a r t y  i s  percent union members 
i n  the  l abor  party.  
Ind ica to r s  of c o n f l i c t  behavior used a r e  s t r i k e  frequency (a count 
of a c t s  represent ing c o l l e c t i v e  decis ions) ,  s t r i k e s  a s  a percent  of a l l  
i n d u s t r i a l  d isputes ,  and labor-related s t r e e t  violence ( f o r  Great- 
Br i t a in ,  by month, wars only).  Where t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  con t rac t  i s  
emphasized, i n  Sweden, time s e r i e s  on these  and on Labor Court deci- 
s ions  have been used t o  supplement and c o n t r a s t  with number of s t r i k e s .  
A repress ion index constructed f o r  Great B r i t a i n  ass igns  a weight 
t o  each piece  of a n t i - s t r i k e  l e g i s l a t i o n .  Weights a r e  assigned on the  
b a s i s  of maximum penalty. Any given period of months during t h e  two 
wars i s  character ized by the  sum of such weights f o r  a l l  l e g i s l a t i o n  
i n  e f f e c t .  Data on prosecution and convict ions under these  Acts i s  
ava i l ab le  f o r  l imi ted  time periods. 
Annual d a t a  were co l l ec ted  f o r  t h e  period 1900 t o  1950 t o  test the  
mobil izat ion hypotheses over the  hal f  century and af ford  background f o r  
t h e  more d e t a i l e d  analyses of t h e  war periods.  Monthly c o n f l i c t  and 
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repression data are available for Britain for the two war periods. In 
addition, annual series of price index and percent unemployed were 
collected for both countries and monthly data on these variables for 
Great Britain monthly during the wars. These are used to compare the 
predictive power of the mobilization/repression theory with the pre- 
dictive power of the two variables most favored by historians and 
economists. 
HYPOTHESES 
1. The Major Theory 
The model shows war to be associated with repression, and that 







Four hypotheses are drawn from tliis model, two about the dynamics 
of mobilization and repression, two predicting the pattern of the level 
of conflict across a war period, 
1. Level of mobilization predicts positively to level of conflict. 
2 .  Level of government repression predicts negatively to level 
of conflict. 
3. Level of domestic conflict is low during war time, relative 
to contextual years. 
4. Drop of conflict level at war onset and rise in conflict at war 
end are associated with the presencelabsence of repression, 
I 
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The methods of analysis used are regression when the data 
available offer a large enough N, and time plots for visual comparison 
when the N is small. 
Theoretically, what we want is a measure of repression, holding 
mobilization constant. Unfortunately, the data available with a large 
enough N for the regression or path analysis (British wartime monthly 
data) do not include mobilization variables. Data on membership and 
income are available annually only -- and in fact are probably meaning- 
ful only for that unit of time. Thus, the second form of analysis -- 
visual comparison of time plots is the best technique possible. 
Sweden represents the control -- that is, assuming that the mobiliza- 
tion patterns are similar, we have Britain as a case of mobilization 
plus repression, and Sweden as a case of mobilization with no 
repression. 
Testing for a linear effect involves the assumption that: the way 
repression operates is that every time a given amount of repression 
is applied, it has the same amount of effect on conflict level, There 
is no wearing-off effect, no terrorizing effect, no threshold before 
which conflict is stimulated by repression and after which conflict 
wanes. 
2. The Minor Theories 
To contrast with the collective action theory we may ask whether 
predictions have been made on the basis of other theories which relate 
war to domestic conflict. Most of the work in political science and 
international relations has tended to assume a "billiard ball" character 
of the nation-state. That is, it is not an entity with any interesting 
internal parts, interrelations or functions. It behaves as a unit: 
either decisions are made by some agent of the collectivity or simul- 
taneous mood changes of individual members account for the single 
course of behavior observed from the outside. The best example of the 
latter is ~immel's insight and ~oser's reformulation in which external 
threat unifies opinion and stills conflict within a group, including 
the nation-state (Sfmmel 1955; Coser 1956), 
Using the indicators, strikes and street violence, the-predicted 









A second prediction regarding level of domestic conflict is 
implicit in the psychological association of frustration and aggression 
i 
in the individual. If time of war is a time of increasing shortages 
and privations, level of frustration should be associated behaviorally 
with increasing level of aggression. Thus, if we take strike frequency 
as an indicator of aggressive behavior, it should increase over the war 




These two theories contrast with the collective action theory with 
regard to the basic social unit in which interests are vested. Simmel's 
theory assumes that the larger unit is the primary source of identity 
for the individual, and interest in its fate would take precedence over 
the interests of individuals or subgroups in conflict. The frustration/ 
aggression th'eory assumes that the interests of the individual are 
primary, and thus conflict level is best predicted by aggregating data 
on individuals whose interests have ,been touched. The collective 
action theory argues that the nation-state is a relatively distant 
entity for the individual, and alone the indfvidual is relatively 
powerless and unlikely to act. The scale at which to observe action 
in the pursuit of interests is at that of the subgroup. 
The prediction derived from the joint functions of mobilization 
and repression is that level of domestic conflict will be generally low 
during a war period relative to contextual years. Since governments 
relay the impact of war to the domestic scene, we should expect that 
conflict level will respond to government action. In particular we 
should be able to see the effect of government repression. In the 
diagram below we see the prediction that conflict continues at the same 
mean level after onset of war until repression sets in; at war end 
conflict continues low until repression is lifted. Only if the two 
coincide would the theory be untestable. 
level 
lo 
war repres- war repres- 
onset sion end sion 
onset end 
Mobilization/~epressfon Prediction 
FINDINGS . - 
1. Mobilization 
A variety of tests of the first hypothesis showed a very strong, 
, L positive prediction3 to conflict for Great Britain and a strong but 
negative prediction to conflict for Sweden. This was true not only 
regarding the strong trend over the fifty-year period but also for 
detrended regression equations. 
Great Britain, detrended: 
Conflict level = constant + 1.437* membership 
- .629* prices - .066 percent 
unemployed - .I15 time 
Cases = 32 
*Asterisked coefficients are stable (< .05 significance level). 
Sweden, detrended: 
Conflict level = constant - 1.101* membership 
- .299 prices -.230 percent 
unemployed + .511 time + e 
Cases = 39 
It can be seen in these equations that membership is a strong pre- 
dictor quite aside from the tendency for unions to grow absolutely over 
the half century,. and even in the same equation with prices and 
unemployment. The fraction of the variance accounted for in Britain 
is very high, moderate in Sweden. 
Findings regarding income as an indicator of mobilization are 
weak. Level of union income tested with the same variety of regression 
equations, with and without first differences and time lags, predicted 
poorly, with little or none of the variance accounted for by four- 
variable equations like those above. 
The provocative contradiction in the effect of membership on 
conflict in the two countries suggests either that we do not have the 
right mobilization indicator or that a more complex causal model is 
needed when we want to think about challenging groups and their 
relationship to polity members and government. This is discussed 
below under "Interpretation, 'I
2. Repression 
Tests comparing Sweden and Great Britain confirmed the hypothesis 
that, holding mobilization "constant," repression results in lower 
*Asterisked coefficients are stable (( .05 significance level). 
conflict level. However, tests regarding the relation between regres- 
sion and conflict level in Britain during World Wars I and I1 resulted 
in two interesting new hypotheses. When the independent variable is 
the anti-strike index and the dependent variable is strike frequency, 
the effect was positive but low and unstable -- negligible. This fits 
with the description of historians, who had already concluded that 
British repression in World War I was ineffective. However, a much 
more relevant and significant test was made. When the anti-strike 
index was used to predict the ratio, strikes as a percent of all indus- 
trial disputes, this indicator responded strongly and negatively 
(-. 558) O .  That is, strikes stopped being the preferred method for 
solving industrial disputes. It appears that mobilization can still 
be conceptualized as predicting positively to level of collective 
action; within this, the proportion which is illegitimate "conflict" 
behavior drops in response to repression. 
In Figures 3 and 4 we can see, first, examples of how the three 
components of "all industrial disputes" vary with the Repression Index, 
and, second, where the twelve-month period of prosecutions and convic- 
tions falls on the time plot of the strikeldispute ratio.. Two earlier 
attempts had been made to secure worker cooperation -- one by a declara- 
tion, one in which labor leaders voluntarily signed an agreement with 
government. As the time plot shows, the strike did not stop being the 
preferred method of solution for disputes until strikers were prose- 
cuted under the Munitions of War Act, The new piece of information is, 
however, that after the prosecutions came to an end, the strike/dispute 
ratio stayed low -- a lingering effect of coercion which will be 
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discussed below under " Interpre ta t ion ."  
A t h i r d  quest ion is  ra i sed  by t h e  f indings  con t ras t ing  World Wars 
I and I1 i n  B r i t a i n ,  The s t r i k e / d i s p u t e  r a t i o  responded magnificently 
t o  a n t i - s t r i k e  l e g i s l a t i o n  and prosecution i n  World War I -- dropping 
from up t o  90 percent  per  month t o  about 20 percent.  The p a t t e r n  i n  
World War 11, however,. could only be c a l l e d  a very weak confirmation. 
The d ips  and rises occur a t  exact ly  t h e  predicted t i m e  p o i n t s , . b u t  
t h e  percent of d i f fe rence  is  minute -- a drop from a mean of 94 percent  
t o  a mean of 83 percent ,  Why was repress ion l e s s  e f f e c t i v e  i n  World 
War I1 than i n  World War I ?  
3. The Minor Theories 
Time p l o t s  w e r e  used t o  compare t h e  p red ic t ions  of the.minor 
theor ies  with t h a t  of t h e  cof lec t fve  a c t i o n  theory. It was found t h a t  
t h e  s t r i k e  frequency and s t r f k e / d i s p u t e  r a t i o  offered the  b e s t  conf i r -  
mation f o r  t h e  mobil izat ion/repressfon theory. The f r u s t r a t i o n /  
aggression predfc t ion found almost no confirmation a t  a l l .  Simmel's 
p red ic t ion  found exact  confirmation i n  t h e  street violence  da ta ,  but 
accounted f o r  almost none of t h e  v a r i a t i o n  i n  s t r i k e  frequency. The 
d i f fe rence  between these  two suggests  t h a t  it was i n  t h e  f n t e r e s t  of 
workers t o  bargain with employers v i a  t h e  s t r i k e ,  but s ince  t h e  wars 
were popular wars, not  t o  ge t  out  onto t h e  s t r e e t s . t o  appeal t o  t h e  
public a s  a t h i r d  par ty .  The hypothesis regarding d i s t a n t  versus  c lose  
u n i t  i n  which membership is  located  would have t o  be t e s t e d  where t h e  
l e v e l  of i n t e r e s t  i s  t h e  same i n  t h e  two cases. 
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INTERPRETATION AND NEW HYPOTHESES 
. 1 The historical background of the Swedish and British labor 
movements suggests that an alternative indicator of mobilization may be 
critical in predicting what will happen to strike activity over time. 
In the case of Sweden upper levels of a pyramided union hierarchy both 
negotiate collective contracts and have unique powers delegated by 
government to police those contracts. The further this system was 
refined, the more strike level dropped. 
In the case of Britain power is decentralized within a loose union 
structure, the legal status of the collective contract is ambiguous, and 
the strike is the language used at low levels for negotiation of 
grievances within the contract period. Unofficial strikes are even 
valued by upper level union officials as contributing to thefr power at 
the bargaining table. In other words, the absence of enabling legisla- 
tion giving power to the top of the union hierarchy is associated with 
the decentralized internal organization, a situation which results in a 
structural dependence on the strike in Great Britafn. 
The first new hypothesis is that an important indicator of mobili- 
zation must be the legal-structural link: the internal structure of the 
social movement and the legal context within which it operates. (See 
the Model of Direct and Indirect Links from Mobilization to Conflict, 
Figure 5. ) 
In addition, we find that the historical background of the two 
countries shows a different relation between labor organizations and 
employer organizations. In Sweden employers, reacting to a political 
strike, surrendered thefr autonomy to a highly centralized national 
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employer organization. In part, unions centralized in self defense and 
in part their growth and organization was a function of the employer 
organization which, instead of fighting union recognition, sought a 
single voice with which to negotiate. 
British employers never really got themselves. together. Individual 
employers to this day may fight unionization by refusing recognition. 
In other words, employer mobilization initiated no counter-mobilization 
by labor in Britain as it did in Sweden. 
This suggests an additional exogenous variable affecting union 
mobilization in the model in Figure 5. Mobilization of a challenger may 
be spurred by a threat from the outside. 
2. The second curious finding is the discrepancy from the strike/ 
dispute ratio in Britain as between world Wars I and 11. Why, by World 
War I1 did the strike remain the preferred solution to industrial 
disputes despite mobilization and repression levels comparable to World 
War I? 
We have discussed the differential response of strikes and strikes 
as a proportion of all industrial disputes. We found that the level of 
"conflict" behavior dropped relative to the total level of all collec- 
tive action on the part of trade unions, In other words, "conflict" 
behavior was responsive to repression. What if the opposite condition 
could be observed? What if instead of repression we observe-trade 
unions through a period of ascending power, successful parliameatary 
coalitions and the formation of the government -- in short, polity 
entrance? 4 
It would be logical to predict that polity entrance would open 
-18- 
legitimate channels of influence to a challenging group and thus we 
should predict less and less of the illegitimate or "conflict" form of 
action. The unresponsiveness of British strikes to repression in World 
War I1 and the gradual climb throughout the 1950s suggests that, while 
some collective action may be diverted into legitimate channels, another 
factor is at work affecting strike level, 5 
We have noted that interaction between employers and workers in 
Britain continued for legal-structural reasons to use the strike as the 
language for minor dispute settlement as well as for contract negotia- 
tion. One hypothesis for explanation of a climbing strike level, given 
these conditions, is that polity entrance confers a kind of legitimacy 
on a challenger: the structure of power within the challenging group's 
organization at the time of movement into the polity is in fact crystal- 
lized by legitimation, Likewise, its favored form of action acquires 
a quality of legitimacy. 
In Britain we have union structure characterized by a high level 
of independence at the local union and shop level. Polity membership 
for labor confirmed and annointed these arrangements. Thus, despite the 
fact that welfare legislation could remove some of the potential strike 
issues, despite the rechanneling of some collective action into legiti- 
mate forms, and despite the wartime repression studied here, strike 
level in Britain rose to record-breaking heights during World War 11. 
Then, after dropping back, the short small strike continued to be the 
favored form of dispute settlement, and strike frequency climbed 
gradually during the entire decade of the fifties, 
What do we find if we re-examine the Swedish data in the light of 
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t h i s  new hypothesis? Do we f ind  that p o l i t i c a l  success and movement i n t o  
t h e  p o l i t y  confirms and re in fo rces  t h e  e x i s t i n g  p a t t e r n  of power within 
unions and r e s u l t s  i n  expansion of t h e i r  p a r t i c u l a r  techniques f o r  
handling c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n s ?  This is  i n  f a c t  what t h e  time p l o t s  show: 
following t h e  Soc ia l  Democrat formation of t h e  government i n  1932, we 
f ind  a continuing drop i n  s t r i k e  level:  
Thus, t h e  second new hypothesis proposes an a l t e r n a t i v e  model f o r  
t h e  explanation of c o n f l i c t ,  i n  which l e v e l  of p o l i t i c a l  success becomes 
an  in tervening var iable .  
3: The simple, l i n e a r  funct ion of repress ion i s  brought i n t o  
ques t ion by t h e  f a c t  that the  s t r i k e / d i s p u t e . r a t i o  stayed low throughout 
World War 1. i n  Great B r i t a i n  even a f t e r  prosecutions came t o  an end. 
. . 
I f  what we a r e  seeing here  is  a l inger ing  e f f e c t , .  i t  suggests  a  new 
hypothesis  regarding t h e  function of repress ion -- w e  have t h e  l i n e a r ,  
t h e  curv i l inea r ,  and t h e  l inger ing  e f f e c t  (e.g., taper ing o f f?  
incorporated i n t o  t r a d i t i o n  and l e v e l l i n g  o f f ? ) .  
When coercion of A has o r  is  intended t o  have an e f f e c t  on B ( the  
r e l a t i o n  of:vict- im and t a r g e t )  o r  when punishment a t  t i m e  point  t has 1 
o r  is intended t o  have an inf luence  on behavior a t  time point  t t h e  2 ' 
term " te r ro r"  has been applied. This would add a new dimension t o  t h e  
concept of repression.  The concept of "expectations" i n  economic and 
s o c i a l  l i f e  has been developed i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  
expectat ion of goods. Very l i t t l e  has been done with the  expectat ion 
of "bads." A re levant  measure f o r  ind iv idua l s  i s  Subjective Expected 
U t i l i t y ,  a  measure represent ing t h e  perceived p robab i l i ty  of a  c e r t a i n  
event times t h e  value i t  has sub jec t ive ly  f o r  t h e  individual .  In  
-20- 
addi t ion ,  t h e r e  i s  psychological research on t h e  condi t ions  under which 
ex t inc t ion  of a l ea rn ing  experience does not take place.  Nothing, 
however, has been done t o  t r a c e  the  development of c u l t u r e  p a t t e r n s  
given t h e  i n t e n s i t y ,  frequency and extension over time of punishment and 
t h r e a t s  of punishment. 
4. I n  conclusion, a hypothesis f o r  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  theory is sug- 
gested by t h e  "rank s t r i k e , "  a remarkable phenomenon which has  occurred 
i n  both Great B r i t a i n  and Sweden, For example, t h e  Railwaymen of B r i t a i n  
s t ruck  because t h e  s c a l e  of t h e i r  wages had, over t h e  years ,  sunk 
r e l a t i v e  t o  the  rank they had previously enjoyed v i s  \a v i s  o the r  occu- 
pat ions.  The most massive s t r i k e  i n  Sweden s ince  t h e  end of World War 
I1 was a s t r i k e  aga ins t  t h e  government by upper l e v e l  c i v i l  se rvan t s  
claiming a 22 percent  pay increase  on t h e  grounds t h a t  i n f l a t i o n  adjus t -  
ment had been made only f o r  manual workers and lower l e v e l  c i v i l  
servants .  For t h i s  they w e r e  ca l l ed  " fasc i s t , "  and the  economist 
Gunnar Myrdal c a l l e d  what was happening "c lass  war," 
This, i n  add i t ion  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  even under a Labor Government 
labor  played i t s  usual  lowly r o l e ,  suggests t h a t ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  earl; 
t a l k  of "revolution," t h e  r e a l  goal of labor  movements was n e i t h e r  t h e  
" jus t ice"  of hegemony nor t h e  " jus t ice"  of equa l i ty  but  a t h i r d  
" jus t ice"  -- one i n  which t h e  deserving a r e  ranked, and l abor  deserves 
a low rank. I f ,  i n  t h e  con tes t  f o r  power l abor  aims f o r  a middle o r  low 
place i n  socie ty ,  t h e  pos tu la te  of r a t i o n a l  man underlying c o n f l i c t  
theory must be questioned. Consensus regarding a low rank f o r  labor  
and, within t h a t  f o r  manual l abor ,  would suggest t h a t  t h e  cornerstone 
of theory must be t h e  shared values of equil ibrium theory r a t h e r  than 
the interests of conflict theory 
SUMMARY 
This research has used a. new approach to the study of relationship 
between foreign and domestic conflict. A model of domestic conflict 
has been used which is comparable to existing models of conflict in 
international relation. Governments are located at the interface of the 
two nested systems and function as actors in both. Just as nation-states 
contend with each other for resources, within nations social groups 
contend for resources and for legal control over them. The conflict 
model has two independent variables -- mobilization and repression. 
These are operationalized in terms of resource-management on the part of 
social groups acting on their interests. 
Hypotheses drawn from the study of collective violence in France 
have been tested in order to contribute to a more comprehensive theory 
of the role of social movements in large-scale structural change.. New 
hypotheses have been generated for testing on other countries, other time 
periods and/or other social movements. 
. . 
The findings show clear effects of government controls on the forms 
of collective action studies, Beyond this, the'data suggest developing 
the causal model in two directions. First, the concept of mobilization 
needs to include organizational factors and thefr legal status, The 
interaction between these two is critical, and has been called here the 
legal-structural link, Second, movement into the polity is a signifi- 
.vH 
cant intervening variable which results not oniy fn a. shift from the 
use of illegitimate to legitimate forms of infiuence, but may even 
-22- 
change the social evaluation of behavior identified with a particular 
challenger such that the illegitimate becomes legitimate. 
The pattern of the repression findings suggests a lingering 
11 terror" effect following coercion. We may need to include coercion 
as a variable in explaining the evolution and maintenance of culture 
patterns. 
The phenomenon of the rank strike suggests some silent consensus 
within labor about the justice of inequality. The lowly place of 
labor in a. nation-state in which a labor party has formed the govern- 
ment similarly suggests that social stratificakion rests to some 
extent on the shared values of equilibrium theory as well as on the 
coercion assumed in conflict theory, 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Gurr has proposed t h a t  t h e  function may be  such t h a t  a low l e v e l  of 
repress ion s t imula tes  while a high l e v e l  of repress ion crushes p r o t e s t  
and c o n f l i c t  behavior (1970). T i l l y  suggests  t h a t  i t  may not  only be 
c u r v i l i n e a r  but  t h a t  t h e  shape of t h e  funct ion may vary a s  between 
forms o f .  government (1970). 
2. Following Sorokin (1937) and C a t t e l l  (1949), l i t t l e  happened regarding 
re la t ionsh ip  between fore ign and domestic c o n f l i c t  u n t i l  t h e  1960s. 
The most ambitious q u a n t i t a t i v e  s t u d i e s  were ~ummel's of 77 nat ions  
f o r  1955-1957 (Rummel 1963) and t h e  r e p l i c a t i o n  by Tanter of 83 
na t ions  f o r  1958-1960 (Tanter 1966). Denton and P h i l l i p s  (1968), and 
Wilkenfeld (1968) contributed q u a n t i t a t i v e  research.  Theoret ica l  
contr ibut ions  and reviews of t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  have been contributed 
by Rosenau (1964, 1969), P r u i t t  and Snyder (1969), Finsterbusch (1972), 
and Wilkenfeld (1973). Some of si&ells proposi t ions  (1955) and 
Coser's reformulat ions of them (1956) are re levant .  
3. The word "predict ion" i s  used f o r  p o i n t s  simultaneous i n  time i n  t h e  
sense t h a t  i f  w e  know one., w e  can p r e d i c t  t h e  o ther .  Where time l a g s  
a r e  used, t h i s  i s  speci f ied .  
4 .  Stinchcombe has suggested th ree  l e v e l s  of p o l i t i c a l  incorporat ion of 
a s o c i a l  subgroup: (1) enfranchisement, (2) t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
majori ty parl iamentary c o a l i t i o n  on i s s u e s  of importance t o  t h a t  
group, and (3) a b i l i t y  of t h a t  major i ty  t o  con t ro l  t h e  government 
(Stinchcombe 1968: 185-186). This could be re f ined  by f u r t h e r  
d iv i s ions  such a s  minori ty member of a minor i ty  c o a l i t i o n ,  majori ty 
member of a minori ty c o a l i t i o n ,  minori ty member of t h e  governing 
c o a l i t i o n ,  major i ty  member of the  governing c o a l i t i o n ,  governing 
without c o a l i t i o n  securely,  insecurely,  e t c .  
.<. " 
5. Supplementary d a t a  f o r  t h e  decade of t h e  1950s were analyzed. 
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